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Dr. Pollock notes that having carefully examined an impressive array
of primary and secondary sources, Shane demonstrates in forceful,
elegant prose that American intervention in the Russian civil war was
consonant with Woodrow Wilson’s principle of selfdetermination. Thanks to the sophistication and cogency of the
argument, and the clarity of the prose, the reader forgets that the
paper is the work of an undergraduate. Indeed, the paper reflects
unusually strong research skills and powers of analysis that would
serve the author well in graduate school and beyond.
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On November 7th, 1917, in the depths of the First World War, the
Bolshevik party of Russia launched a revolution that ousted the prowar democratic government of Alexander Kerensky and replaced it
with a communist dictatorship. This new government alarmed and
antagonized Russia’s previous allies Britain, France, and the United
States almost from the moment of its inception. The Bolsheviks’
refusal to acknowledge any of Russia’s debts, alongside their
government’s hope for immediate peace with Germany, raised
doubts among the British and French over their chances for victory.1
For American President Woodrow Wilson, however, it was the
fall of democracy and the ascendency of communism that seemed
the most disturbing part of the Revolution. President Wilson believed
strongly in democracy and self-determination of peoples, and saw
communist ideology as a suppression of these natural rights.2 As time
passed and Russia’s absence from the fighting began to weigh heavily
on British and French war efforts, these powers sought to intervene
in Russia’s civil war to install a government capable of re-opening the
eastern front, among other objectives.3
Despite cold relations with the Bolshevik government, Wilson
initially declined all proposals for military intervention, believing
them to be infeasible. As time passed and conditions within Russia
rapidly changed, however, Wilson began to consider intervention a
possibility. Though intervention in Russia might be interpreted as a
departure from Wilson’s principle of self-determination, he did not
view it as such. American intervention in Russia was designed to
complement and expand upon earlier peaceful attempts to end the
Bolshevik movement. Intervention was used to satisfy the Allies’
desire for action while simultaneously attempting to achieve Wilson’s
primary goal of restoring democracy and self-determination to a
nation he believed had been forced into communism against its will.
1

Carol Melton, Between War and Peace: Woodrow Wilson and the American
Expeditionary Force in Siberia, 1918-1921 (Macon: Mercer University Press, 2001), 3.
2
David Foglesong, America’s Secret War against Bolshevism: U.S. Intervention in the
Russian Civil War, 1917-1920 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995),
66-67.
3
Supreme War Council to President Wilson, 2 July 1918, in Betty Unterberger, ed.,
American Intervention in the Russian Civil War (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company,
1969), 37-38.
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Even before the Bolshevik revolution, Wilson had never had
any qualms about using the military to stabilize a country that
appeared ready to slide into anarchy. The president had used the
military to intervene in Mexico in April of 1914 when that nation was
suffering a disruptive civil war. Many of Wilson’s actions during this
intervention would mimic his later decisions in Russia.4 His objective
in Mexico was to restore order and democracy, the same goal he
would later echo when discussing Russian intervention.
Prior to direct intervention in Mexico’s civil war, Wilson first
attempted to find a method of ending Mexico’s troubles that did not
involve the military. Before deciding to intervene, the president
considered non-recognition of the new government, arms shipments
to counter-revolutionary groups, and searching for “strong men to
restore order” as viable strategies; ultimately these tactics would all be
employed in both Mexico and in Russia.5 These similarities suggest
that Wilson’s goals for Russia were in line with his goals for Mexico,
namely the restoration of order and the establishment of democracy
in a nation that appeared to the president to be falling to anarchic
elements.
Even with a history of intervention and a personal belief in
self-determination, committing troops to a distant front during
wartime would be dangerous at best, something Wilson’s Chief of
Staff Newton Baker often mentioned to the president.6 Wilson’s
ideological beliefs were highly important to him, and it was ultimately
ideological concerns that convinced the president, against the advice
of his chief of staff, to agree to intervention. These ideological
concerns took the form of a genuine fear of socialism, particularly its
potential to incite revolution and its harsh anti-individualist rhetoric.
Wilson characterized socialism as a disruptive and destructive
force, claiming that socialist “method is madness,” and that he would
“reject, as [I] would reject poison itself, the prescriptions of
Socialism.”7 Wilson feared that Bolshevik ideology would come to
4

Melton, 16.
Foglesong, 17-20.
6
Melton, 24.
7
Woodrow Wilson, as quoted in Foglesong, 28.
5
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America via immigrants and in many speeches expressed mistrust of
new American citizens, culminating in a Red Scare directed against
immigrants in the late 1910s.8 His hatred of socialism would
eventually lead him to claim in 1919 that “Bolshevism was a greater
menace than the risk of a reversion to tsarism.”9
Wilson’s Secretary of State Robert Lansing shared and even
surpassed Wilson’s mistrust of socialism. He believed radical change
was indicative of rash decisions and believed socialism could only be
achieved through strong central government, which would ultimately
destroy American individualism.10 Lansing’s hatred of socialism made
him one of the leading figures in the campaign to convince Wilson to
intervene in Russia. He was the minister who first suggested
intervention to support the reactionary leader of the White Army,
General Kaledin, in his attempt to topple the Bolshevik
government.11 These examples indicate that two of America’s
highest-ranking policymakers had a strong antipathy to socialism, and
Wilson’s personal views toward self-determination and democracy
made him an early enemy of the Bolshevik regime.
In spite of this willingness to intervene and Wilson’s personal
antipathy to socialism, when Kerensky’s government fell in the
Bolshevik Revolution, intervention was not the first thing on
President Wilson’s mind. Wilson was initially firmly against any type
of intervention in Russia, although he was sympathetic to the turmoil
the country was experiencing. Wilson originally believed, prudently,
that intervention in Russia would either be misconstrued or
propagandized as a hostile or imperialist action and that it might
ultimately turn liberal Russians away from their democratic
principles.
This view was stressed to the Japanese government, one of the
most ardent supporters of intervention, in a diplomatic note of
March 5, 1918.12 When Secretary of State Lansing forwarded requests
for Siberian intervention from other Allies later that same month,
8

Foglesong, 41.
Foglesong, 186.
10
Foglesong, 30.
11
Lansing to Wilson on Kaledin Movement, 10 December 1917, in Unterberger, 27-28.
12
Wilson’s Draft Statement against Intervention, 5 March 1918, in Unterberger, 31.
9
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Wilson wrote yet again of his reservations: “I have put to [the British
ambassador to the United States] Lord Reading and all others who
argue in favour of intervention… What is it to effect and how will it
be efficacious in effecting it?”13
Wilson did not initially believe that sending troops to Russia
would achieve any purpose beneficial to the Russian people and was
privately concerned that Japanese interests in Siberia were territorial
rather than altruistic in nature.14 Wilson was always willing to provide
support to counter-revolutionary groups, but in the months
immediately following the Bolshevik Revolution he was unwilling to
commit to direct military intervention. It would not be until later in
1918 that new developments would provide Wilson with the
justification he believed he would need to send American troops to
Russia.
This is not to suggest that the Allies passively accepted Wilson’s
reluctance to intervene, for they did not. For Britain and France, the
issue of Russian intervention was primarily a military one and was
viewed as critically important by both governments. With Russia out
of the war and the Germany free to divert all of its forces to the
western front, both powers feared the possibility of a rapid defeat.
According to Carol Melton, “almost immediately after the November
Revolution… Marshal Ferdinand Foch, Generalissimo of the Allied
armies, suggested that the allies undertake armed intervention in
Russia… using it as a means to restore the Eastern Front.”15 While
this idea was initially dismissed, it gradually gained support with the
Allies until it became a major point of contention with the
noncommittal United States.
What followed was several months of diplomatic prodding from
virtually all of the Allies in an attempt to persuade Wilson to change
his mind and approve of, if not participate in, Russian intervention.
The first formal request came from the British Foreign Office in
January of 1918, but this was only to be the beginning of a much

13

Lansing to Wilson, 22 March 1918, as appears in Unterberger, 32.
Foglesong, 146-149.
15
Melton, 3.
14
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larger campaign.16 On February 26-27, both the British and French
sent renewed requests to approve of intervention, and throughout
the entire month of March Wilson was inundated with requests from
every member of the Allies, including the Supreme War Council, to
agree to intervention.17 In spite of the immense diplomatic pressure
he was under, Wilson was unwilling to approve of any intervention
that appeared to violate his self-determination principles, and he thus
vetoed all proposals for direct intervention that he received. The
Allies were likewise unwilling to accept a total lack of intervention,
but by the beginning of April it was obvious that Wilson would not
approve military intervention unless new developments arose, and
the Allies thus grudgingly let the matter drop.
Wilson’s initially cool attitude toward military intervention was
balanced by a more vigorous approval of other forms of intervention,
partially stemming from a desire to prove to the Allies that in other
forums the president could be a team player. Wilson’s concerns
about military intervention did not preclude the possibility of
supporting counter-revolutionary groups in other ways, and via these
methods the president set out to prove himself. Barely a month after
the Bolshevik Revolution, Lansing drafted a proposal to the president
that recommended the support of General Kaledin and a military
dictatorship as a better alternative for Russia than Bolshevism.18
Kaledin and his fellow counter-revolutionaries desperately needed
money, but without formal diplomatic recognition the United States
could loan them nothing.
In spite of this, Wilson considered the support of these counterrevolutionary groups important enough that he worked out a plan
with the British and French to circumvent the obstacle. Instead of
supporting Kaledin directly, America loaned money to the Allies,
which was then used by those governments to supply the counterrevolutionary White armies.19 This move is exemplary of Wilson’s

16

Melton, 3-4.
Melton, 5-7 and Unterberger, 32.
18
Secretary Robert Lansing’s Memorandum and Draft Telegram on the Kaledin Movement,
December 10, 1917, as appears in Unterberger, 27-28.
19
Foglesong, 88-90.
17
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early strategies for intervention, which were often shrouded in
secrecy so as to avoid antagonizing any Americans sympathetic to the
Bolshevik cause and almost universally involved supporting these
counter-revolutionary groups with American funds.
In another example, Wilson permitted the diplomatic envoy for
the provisional government of Kerensky, Boris Bakhmeteff, to retain
his status as a diplomatic representative of “Loyal Russia.” Along
with this recognition came access to millions of dollars in leftover
loans that the United States had provided for the now-defunct
provisional government. Bakhmeteff’s embassy would use these
funds to support counter-revolutionary actions by purchasing and
transferring supplies, such as rifles, for the White armies.20 While
Wilson was initially hesitant to directly interfere in the quagmire that
was the early Russian Civil War, he did not hesitate to provide
financial support to the factions that appeared most likely to restore a
democratic Russia. It would only take a just cause for Wilson to
conclude that direct intervention could be used to help Russia.
That just cause came in the form of a telegram received in June
of 1918 from the American ambassador to China, Paul Reinsch.
Reinsch was writing of several thousand Czechoslovakian prisoners
of war that were attempting to reach the Siberian port city of
Vladivostok. From Vladivostok they intended to find passage to
France, where they could rejoin the war effort on the side of the
Allies. The Soviets had given permission to these POWs to leave via
Vladivostok, but Reinsch advised against permitting the pro-Ally
troops to do so. He claimed that they could be invaluable to any
future Allied operations in Siberia, especially in preventing the
expansion of German influence.21 Wilson agreed with him, replying
just a few days later, “There seems to me to emerge from this
suggestion the shadow of a plan that might be worked, with Japanese
and other assistance. These people are cousins of the Russians.”22

20

Foglesong, 58-60.
Ambassador Paul S. Reinsch to Lansing, 13 June 1918, in Unterberger, 34.
22
Wilson to Reinsch, 17 June 1918, in Unterberger, 35.
21
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While Reinsch was thinking of the Czechoslovakian presence in
terms of German influence, from Wilson’s mentioning of “Japanese
and other assistance [emphasis added]” and the consideration of their
Slavic ties to the Russians, it is clear that Wilson was considering their
role in a larger intervention.
While Wilson was formulating his plan for this new intervention,
Lansing sent him a memo that now claimed that these troops were
being attacked by Bolsheviks attempting to prevent them from
reaching Vladivostok, and suggesting that support be sent to them
immediately as a means of securing the Trans-Siberian Railway.23 In
terms of Russian policy, this memo was one of the most important to
reach President Wilson’s desk. The document provided Wilson with
the diplomatic pretext he needed to intervene in Russia without
appearing to infringe upon Russia’s right of self-determination.
Intervention was now instead a rescue operation for these
Czechoslovakian troops, something that the American people would
support and could also diplomatically shield Wilson from claims that
he was deviating from his Fourteen Points.24 Wilson could now
commit troops to Russia without fearing the significant diplomatic
and socialist backlash he expected would follow an unjustified
intervention.
Although the president had begun these tentative plans for
Russian intervention as soon as he received the Peking memo, to
suggest that Wilson made the decision to intervene in a vacuum
would be a serious fallacy. As previously discussed, from January to
April the Allies had pressed seriously for intervention, and when the
Czechoslovakian situation arose, their efforts to secure American
intervention re-doubled. Just a few weeks after receiving the Peking
memo, both Japan and the Supreme War Council of the Allies sent
requests reiterating hopes for American cooperation in intervention,
and in the case of the Supreme War Council, detailing the reasons
they believed intervention was necessary. These reasons included

23
24

Lansing on Czechoslovakian situation, 23 June 1918, in Unterberger, 35.
Foglesong, 144.
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“To assist the Russian nation to throw off their German
oppressors… To shorten the war by the reconstitution of the
Russian front… To deny to Germany the supplies of western Siberia
and the important military stores at Vladivostok… To bring
assistance to the Czecho-Slovak forces.”25
In principle Wilson did not object to any of these goals, and now
that he had a valid reason for intervention he was inclined to placate
his allies by cooperating in operations within Russia.26 It is important
to differentiate these motivating factors from deciding factors,
however. Allied pressure upon Wilson encouraged him to enter
Russia, but Allied pressure alone could not override his ideological
concerns, the primary factor discouraging his involvement. Only the
situation surrounding the Czechoslovakian legion, and the pretext of
protection that it provided the United States government, allowed
Wilson to agree to intervention. If he had agreed prior to having a
just cause, he would have been knowingly violating his selfdetermination principle, something the president was never willing to
do, while also exposing himself to diplomatic and socialist backlash at
home. Therefore, while Allied pressure played an important role in
convincing Wilson to send troops to Russia, that pressure did not
actually permit him to do so; the Czechoslovakian legion’s
supposedly dire situation was what granted Wilson the diplomatic
pretext he needed to finally agree to the requests of the Allies.
Wilson’s response to the Czechoslovakian situation is not
enough alone to condemn intervention upon their behalf as a pretext,
and so other sources must be used to help clarify the situation. The
American commander of the Siberian expedition, General Graves,
also addresses the issue and provides important context. Graves
notes that Czechoslovakian forces had control of the railroad in
Siberia “two months before Japan and the United States decided to go to their
relief [emphasis his],” and that their unofficial leader, Professor Tomas
Masaryk, had ordered them not to retreat via Vladivostok weeks

25

Japan to Allied Governments on Siberia, 26 June 1918, and Supreme War Council’s to
President Wilson, 3 July 1918, in Unterberger, 35-38.
26
Foglesong, 38.
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before Wilson decided to send troops to Siberia, ostensibly to assist
them in leaving.27
It could be argued that intelligence during the time was unreliable
and Wilson did not know of these facts, but when General Graves
arrived in Siberia in September of 1918 and learned of the stability of
the Czechoslovakian situation, he telegraphed Washington, saying,
“Conditions are very satisfactory for Czechs in Siberia,” but he
received no response or change of orders.28 General Graves also
claims that American Consul General Poole sent a message to the
Czechoslovakian legion in mid-June 1918 that congratulated them on
their successes against the Bolsheviks and suggested that the United
States would be in favor of their occupation of the Trans-Siberian
Railway.29 It seems reasonable to extrapolate that the United States
did not believe that the security of the Czechoslovakians in any way
altered the purpose of the Siberian expedition, and potentially that
the United States was fully aware that the Czechoslovakians were in
no danger at all. This suggests that the true purpose of the expedition
was never a rescue mission, and that the excuse of protecting the
Czechoslovakians was always merely a diplomatic pretext for some
other goal of Wilson’s.
Although the steps toward intervention have now been clarified,
Wilson’s hopes for what intervention in Russia could accomplish
have yet to be addressed. The president’s goals for intervention were
never directly stated, and it is therefore difficult to see what Wilson
intended it to accomplish. Only by carefully analyzing the usage of
American troops in Russia can the outline of his goals be discovered.
One of the most important documents in regards to the usage of
troops in Russia is the Aide Memoir, a document drafted by
President Wilson which outlined the acceptable use of American
forces in Russia. Despite having agreed to intervention, Wilson sets
an extremely conservative tone in the Aide Memoir, saying, “the only
legitimate object for which American or allied troops can be
27

William Graves, America’s Siberian Adventure, 1918-1920 (New York: Jonathan Cape and
Harrison Smith, Inc., 1931), 340-341.
28
Melton, 51.
29
Graves, 70.
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employed, [we] submit, is to guard military stores… and to render
such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of
their own self-defense.”30 Wilson had no control over the Allied
forces, and so his hopes that they would be used in this manner were
in vain. Nevertheless, it is clear that Wilson did not intend for
American troops to use force to achieve any particular objective. If
this is so, why would Wilson send troops to Russia in an effort to
destroy Bolshevism if they were not permitted to take any action
against the government?
In practice, American troops in Siberia were sent to stabilize the
region by assisting in operating the Trans-Siberian Railway and
pacifying the people of Siberia, an expanded version of the same
goals that Ambassador Reinsch advised Wilson the Czechoslovakians
could accomplish.31 Wilson hoped these ostensibly benevolent goals,
which he believed would not agitate the Bolshevik government in
Moscow, would allow the Czechoslovakians to entrench themselves
and gain local support. The Czechoslovakians’ nature as “cousins of
the Russians” would allow them to gain the trust and respect of the
Russian people, who could then “make Siberia safe for Russian
democracy.”32 Wilson never intended to use American troops as
combat forces to bring down Bolshevism. It was his policy to use
American forces as stabilizers to allow other groups such as the
Czechoslovakians or later White forces under Admiral Kolchak to
become nuclei for further resistance movements. These movements
could then be encouraged to march on Moscow and oust the
Bolshevik government. In this way the president could intervene
without being accused of violating his own principles of selfdetermination, for ultimately it would be a Russian group that would
oust the Bolsheviks and choose, ostensibly independent of any
outside influence, their new form of government.

30

Graves, 8.
Ambassador Reinsch to Wilson, 13 June 1918, in Unterberger, 34.
32
In Unterberger, 35, and Foglesong, 164.
31
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Wilson’s hopes for intervention did not match its reality. Almost
immediately, the Allies attempted to expand the scope of their
operations in Russia. First they suggested the Czechoslovakian legion
move further west, which the United States protested as a hostile
move toward the Bolshevik regime.33 After this, the French
petitioned the United States to send commissioners to Siberia, which
Secretary of State Lansing believed was an attempt to “impress our
action in Siberia with the character of intervention rather than
relief.”34
When the United States proved unwilling to expand intervention
diplomatically, the other Allies began to act of their own accord.
General Graves regularly wrote of the divisions of the Allies in
Siberia, often stating his belief that the Japanese funded the
disruptive and brutal regimes of the Cossack chiefs Kalmikov and
Semenov in the hopes of discrediting the White movement, in effect
disrupting the work of all the other Allies.35 General Graves held a
decidedly negative opinion of Allied operations in general, holding
the personal belief that it was Japan’s goal to “occupy Eastern
Siberia,” and that the Allies overtly attempted to destroy Bolshevism
contrary to the spirit of Wilson’s agreement to intervene in Russia. 36
While Wilson wanted the Bolshevik government to be toppled, he
believed that the Russian people should be the ones to do so, and
that the only duty of the Allies in Russia was to make the nation
stable enough for the Russians to accomplish this on their own.
Wilson miscalculated in believing the Russian people would fight for
a democracy, and the gross excesses and reactionary natures of
Kalmikov and Semenov prevented any Russian democracy from ever
forming in Siberia.
In the northern Russian theater, the Allies deviated even further
from Wilson’s plans, and events there seem to support Graves’s
belief that the other Allies were not inclined to follow Wilson’s
ideological approach to intervention. American troops in the
33

Lansing’s Memorandum of 20 August 1918, in Unterberger, 43.
Lansing to Wilson, 22 August 1918, in Unterberger, 43.
35
Melton, 55-58.
36
Graves, 62, 194.
34
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northern port of Archangelsk, which were under the command of
British General Poole, were actively used in fighting the Soviet
regime rather than merely guarding the supplies at Archangelsk as
Wilson had ordered.37 Although Wilson had entered Russia with the
hopes that no Allied soldier would need to raise a weapon to end the
Bolshevik regime, this was not the same mentality that the other
Allies held. Japan’s interests in Siberia were expansionist in nature,
while the French and British still believed an eastern front could be
reconstituted and were willing to topple the Bolshevik government
by force to see it done. The Allies did not respect Wilson’s wishes for
intervention in Russia, and thus his hopes were dashed. The
Czechoslovakians and the regime of Admiral Kolchak both failed to
unite Siberia into a force strong enough to fight the Bolsheviks, and
the disastrous Archangelsk campaign failed to even recover the
supplies they were sent to retrieve. War-weary and disillusioned,
Admiral Kolchak’s government collapsed in December of 1919, and
Secretary of State Lansing promptly suggested the withdrawal of
American troops.38 America’s Siberian adventure had failed.
Even in failure, President Wilson’s policies of intervention and
democratization had long-lasting, and unintended, effects. A British
attaché in Moscow in the fall of 1918, Robert Lockhart, held the view
that the direct effect of the Archangelsk landing and General Poole’s
subsequent decision to attack with such a small force “was to provide
the Bolsheviks with a cheap victory, to give them new confidence,
and to galvanize them.”39 Lockhart believed that the Allied policy of
intervention assisted the Bolsheviks to consolidate their control over
Russia, in effect reversing its goals.
Even if Lockhart’s summation of the situation is exaggerated, the
intervention in Russia had other profound effects, particularly
diplomatically. The Bolsheviks saw intervention as capitalism’s
inevitable attempt to crush socialism and viewed the powers that
participated as hostile.40 This mistrust did not dissipate with time, and
37

Foglesong, 211-219.
Lansing to Wilson, 23 December 1919, in Unterberger, 50.
39
Robert Lockhart, as quoted in Foglesong, 221.
40
Foglesong, 272.
38
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indeed it can be viewed as a major factor in the relations of the cold
war. Speaking in America in 1959, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev
said, “armed intervention in Russia was the most unpleasant thing
that ever occurred in the relations between our two countries.”41
Clearly there was a continuity of mistrust between Russia and the
West over this infringement upon her sovereignty, even though
Wilson attempted to achieve it in the most diplomatic and peaceful
way possible.
Although Wilson succeeded in satisfying his allies by agreeing to
intervene in Russia, he did not succeed in restoring democracy to the
country, and indeed he can be viewed as accomplishing nothing more
in Russia than setting the stage for the later and greater mistrust of
the Cold War Era.
–

41

Nikita Khrushchev, as quoted in Foglesong, 7.
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